

20 August 1953

FACTORS

The urgency for effecting a change in the Government of Guatemala, while effective opposition still exists and before the cancer of Communism has spread and established itself still more firmly in this Hemisphere, is further aggravated by the approaching coffee harvest and the concurrent necessity for at least threatening some economic pressure before this year's crop is sold in December. While other action will be necessary, it is recognized that only through military action can a new and stable government, friendly to the United States, be established promptly. It is agreed that KOTD is the only individual with the background, ideals, following and organization who can satisfactorily effect this change through armed action. However, during the past year the Government of Guatemala and the Communist elements within the country have strengthened their position, while that of at least some of the opposition elements has deteriorated.

1. The probability of military success will be greatly strengthened if plans are revised to include:

a. Capture of Guatemala City from within, rather than from without by an attack which would be dependent upon possibly unreliable guerrilla forces from the interior. The capture of the capital can be accomplished ~~immediately~~ if the officers of its garrison are converted, extorted, abducted or assassinated concurrently with other effective measures. Although the purported organization of 50,000 anti-Communists in cells may still be intact, the effective participation of an appreciable percentage

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of this group in organized formal military action is too uncertain at this time to permit sound planning to place too heavy dependences upon them as members of a guerrilla army. Unless there is a decided re-stimulation of anti-Communist elements, coupled with strong indications of initial success on 7-Day, it is possible that many elements would not rise to form such a guerrilla army. It also appears that some of these elements could be utilized more effectively in types of action which do not call for sustained combat courage in the face of organized troops.

b. Relocation of the new provisional government in the capital rather than in a remote point such as Puerto Barrios as originally proposed. The announcement from the capital of a new government with appreciable Armed Forces backing, coupled with the announcement of strong forces moving on the capital from outlying districts, would carry with it assurance of success and would give the necessary courage to rise to many of the civilian components who might be unwilling otherwise to take the initiative. A provisional government established in the capital would also command more respect and permit more open support from other governments than one precariously established at a remote point.

c. Capture of the communications and public utilities facilities at the very outset of the action. Capture of the Government Radio Station in Guatemala City is an important element in enabling the new provisional government to call the people together and

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and to solicit the support of other governments. Plans should insure at a minimum the control of all communications facilities (including military air), throughout the country, to the Guatemalan Government.

2. The probability of military success can be further strengthened if steps are taken to the support of a major proportion of the Armed Forces. A softening-up campaign to precede armed action should therefore shake the faith of the Army in its Government and in its own future under that Government by:

- a. Showing to the Armed Forces that the Government is against civilians and placing more reliance on the Communist Party of the Central Military.
- b. Projecting external dangers and military weaknesses with neighboring countries.
- c. Providing external and military training missions to neighboring countries.
- d. Withdrawing military missions to Guatemala and concentrating on El Salvador.

The non-political Guatemalan Armed Forces are quite likely to turn against a government which, by its own prejudiced actions, is weakening its military and forcing the strengthening of its neighbors, and at the same time is causing the non-Communist civilians. Individual officers who remain loyal to the Government must be eliminated by other means.

3. The probability of military success can be further strengthened

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through the employment of TV designed to strengthen the will of the opposition, break the faith of and create dissension among present supporters of the Government, and discredit the Government with the Domestic World. TV should include at least the threat of a conference of OAS or of Foreign Ministers to consider evidence that Guatemala constitutes a threat to Hemisphere security through its support of International Communism. This conference should be held in November and sufficient convincing, incontrovertible evidence must be provided, by fabrication if necessary.

1. The probability of military success may be further strengthened through bringing to KHRG, or threatening, certain economic pressures. Some economic pressure is feasible and can be effective. The threat of other economic pressures can be equally effective.

2. The probability of military success can be greatly strengthened through the delivery of material to [] by the following means:

a. Delivery of material by [] to the Free Port of New York for pickup and delivery by [] to KHRG.

b. Purchase and delivery of additional material through the Free Port of New York [] to KHRG.

This material (cost approximately \$400,000) to be purchased for KHRG by [] with money delivered to KHRG through foreign sources and turned over by him to [] will make his military base [] available to KHRG.

6. Any probability of military [] can be strengthened

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support of KUFU and his group, as a minimum

- a. With a payment of \$10,000 in the immediate future to satisfy present debts and commitments.
- b. With \$10,000 monthly regular payments from 1 September 1972 until D-Day which will permit KUFU to hold his present organization together.

The payments listed above are considerably lower than the figures projected by KUFU, but are believed to be sufficient to maintain an effective resistance group, and not so high as to attract undue attention to the maintenance of such a group. Such payments can be made through foreign sources so that they cannot be attributed to any U. S. source. Other payments for the purchase of transport and other items of special equipment may be necessary.

- c. With the expenditure of further sums at the time military action is initiated and during the establishing of the new government. In the thirty days prior to D-Day as much as \$250,000 may be required. Money requirements during the period in which the new Government is establishing itself can be handled on an overt loan basis.

All action taken must be carefully planned in detail, timed to perfection, and fruitlessly executed. Support of all interested groups must be prompt and complete.

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